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Quantum key distribution (QKD) uniquely allows distribution of cryptographic keys with security
verified by quantum mechanical limits. Both protocol execution and subsequent applications require
the assistance of classical data communication channels. While using separate fibers is one option,
it is economically more viable if data and quantum signals are simultaneously transmitted through a
single fiber. However, noise-photon contamination arising from the intense data signal has severely
restricted both the QKD distances and secure key rates. Here, we exploit a novel temporal-filtering
effect for noise-photon rejection. This allows high-bit-rate QKD over fibers up to 90 km in length and
populated with error-free bidirectional Gb/s data communications. With high-bit rate and range
sufficient for important information infrastructures, such as smart cities and 10 Gbit Ethernet, QKD
is a significant step closer towards wide-scale deployment in fiber networks.
Quantum key distribution (QKD)[1, 2] has been estab-
lished as a viable technology over dedicated fibers [3–5].
In the absence of data signals on the same fiber, secure
key rates exceeding 1 Mb/s [6–8] and a transmission dis-
tance of over 250 km [9, 10] have been achieved. To date,
most experiments and field trials have been performed
on dark fibers. As dark fiber is a scarce and expensive
resource, there is a pressing need to enable QKD’s co-
existence with data signals on the same fiber [11–16].
However, all work so far (see Table I) has been limited
to very low bit rates, short fiber spans, and/or unidi-
rectional data communications. Using a novel temporal-
filtering effect, we demonstrate QKD in the presence of
error-free bidirectional Gb/s data transfer with a secure
bit rate which is over three orders of magnitude higher
than previously reported.
The main challenge for the coexistence of quantum
and data signals on the same fiber arises from the ex-
treme contrast in their intensities. Each quantum sig-
nal typically contains approximately 0.5 photons per
pulse when implementing decoy protocols with weak laser
pulses[17, 18], while a data-laser pulse may contain 106
photons or more for a Gb/s link. Although the data-laser
signal can be readily filtered using wavelength multiplex-
ing, secondary photons, resulting from its Raman and
nonlinear interaction with the fiber, are impossible to re-
ject completely because of their spectral overlap with the
quantum signal. Placing the quantum channel spectrally
far away from the data channels can reduce the spectral
overlap. However,in such systems the quantum channel
is often in the 1310 nm band [11–13] or shorter (< 1 µm)
[19, 20]. The fiber transmission loss is much higher at
these wavelengths, which further restricts the QKD dis-
tance and secure key rate. Other common techniques
for noise-photon rejection include reducing the data-laser
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intensities [11, 14] and spectral filtering [14]. Exploit-
ing data pulse gaps has also been demonstrated to sup-
press Raman photons scattered from copropagating data
pulses [13].
Raman photons reach the detector at random times
with respect to the regularly pulsed quantum signals. We
show that this randomness can be exploited for enhanc-
ing the quantum signal to Raman noise ratio (SNR). Us-
ing subnanosecond gated InGaAs avalanche photodiodes
(APDs) [21], we have achieved a ten-fold enhancement
in the SNR through temporal-filtering, thereby demon-
strating high-bit-rate QKD over record distances of a sin-
gle fiber multiplexed with 1 Gb/s error-free bidirectional
data signals.
Figure 1(a) shows the experimental setup. Two com-
municating parties, referred to as Alice and Bob, are
FIG. 1. Experimental setup. (a) Schematics for multiplexing
of quantum, clock and data channels; (b) Quantum trans-
mitter; (c) Quantum receiver. SD-APD: self-differencing
avalanche photodiodes; att.: optical attenuator; CWDM:
coarse wavelength division multiplexer; NBF: narrow band-
pass filter (0.56 nm).
2TABLE I. Summary of existing quantum/data multiplexing demonstrations.
QKD wavelength (nm) Data wavelength (nm) Distance (km) Bit rate (kbit/s)
BT[11] 1310 1550 28 -
Telcordia[12] 1310 1550 25 0.006
Cork[13] 1310 1290, 1550 10 1.3
Geneva[14] 1551.72 1555.33–1555.75 50 0.011
Madrid[15] 1550 1310, 1490 10 0.1
This work 1550 1591–1611 50 507
90 7.6
linked by a single fiber. At each party, there are three
subsystems for quantum, clock and data communica-
tions. The quantum subsystem is described in Appendix
A. Both quantum and clock channels are unidirectional
from Alice to Bob, while the data channel is formed from
a symmetric bidirectional Gb/s link running at the stan-
dard data clock rate of 1.25 Gb/s. These channels are
multiplexed using coarse wavelength division multiplex-
ers (CWDM) for transmission through the single fiber.
The CWDMs feature an insertion loss of 0.5—1 dB at
passbands, centered at 1551, 1571, 1591 and 1611 nm.
The fiber link is made of dispersion-shifted fiber featur-
ing low chromatic dispersion of 4 ps/nm·km and a mea-
sured loss of 0.2 dB/km at 1550 nm. Standard single-
mode fiber can also be used by precompensating fiber
dispersion at longer distances (greater than 50 km) [22].
To minimise loss of quantum transmission, the 1551 nm
CWDM band is assigned to the quantum subsystem.
Figure 2(a) shows a spectrum of back-scattered sec-
ondary photons generated by a 1611 nm continuous-wave
laser (linewidth: <0.1 nm) launched into an 80 km fiber
at 0 dBm power (1 mW). Rayleigh scattered photons
are approximately 4 orders of magnitude more intense
than the Raman-scattered photons. As the Rayleigh pho-
tons have the same wavelength as the 1611 nm laser,
they can be readily rejected from the 1551 nm CWDM
passband used by the quantum subsystem, as shown in
Fig. 2(a). However, Raman photons spectrally extend
over the 1551 nm passband. Consequently, a consider-
able fraction of Raman photons enter the quantum re-
ceiver through the CWDM coupler.
We have systematically studied how much light is
Raman-scattered into the 1551 nm passband by other
CWDM channels in order to assign the wavelengths for
classical communication. A 1 mW continuous-wave laser
signal is launched into the fiber link through one of the
remaining CWDM channels at either Alice’s or Bob’s
side, and we measure the scattered light power in the
1551 nm output of Bob’s CWDM module. The measured
power quantifies the amount of Raman scatter entering
the quantum receiver through the 1551 nm channel. Fig-
ure 2(b) shows the Raman scatter power (symbols) as a
function of fiber length between Alice and Bob in 5 km
intervals for three different CWDM channels. For each
channel the backward scatter (light launched on Bob’s
side) and forward scatter (light launched on Alice’s side)
are shown, together with the result of a theoretical cal-
culation (solid lines). This calculation is outlined in Ap-
pendix C.
Forward and backward scatter display a distinctively
different behavior with increasing fiber length. Whereas
forward scatter reaches a maximum value at a distance
of about 20 km before it starts to decline, backward scat-
ter saturates and does not decrease with distance. In the
case of forward scatter the accumulation of Raman power
along the fiber is eventually outstripped by the increas-
ing fiber attenuation, leading to a reduction of Raman
noise. In contrast, backward scatter travels back to the
quantum receiver and is not subjected to higher loss with
increasing distance. Hence, backward scatter never de-
creases but reaches saturation asymptotically.
At each fixed wavelength, the backward Raman scat-
ter is always stronger than the forward scatter, and be-
comes dominant for long fibers. Additionally, for all
wavelengths studied, the further the laser is spectrally
away from the 1511 nm passband, the weaker the Ra-
man scatter. Assigning Bob’s data-laser to the 1611nm
channel therefore minimizes the Raman scatter into the
quantum receiver, as this configuration minimizes the
amount of back scatter. The two remaining wavelengths
of 1571 and 1591 nm are assigned to Alice’s lasers. As
the clock laser needs comparably lower launch power (see
Appendix B), it is preferable to assign the shorter wave-
length of 1571 nm to the clock subsystem.
Figure 3 compares the combined Raman noise caused
by both Alice’s (1591 nm) and Bob’s (1611 nm) data-
lasers with the strength of the quantum signal at a flux
of 0.5 photons per pulse at 1 GHz (thin solid line). We
omit the contribution of the clock laser because of its
low launch power (see Appendix B). The Raman noise is
stronger than the quantum signal for every fiber length,
especially for long fibers. At 90 km, the Raman noise is
approximately 27 dB stronger than the quantum signal.
Such a noise level would result in a quantum bit error rate
(QBER) close to 50%, preventing formation of a secure
key. To obtain a secure key, the QBER must be below
10%, a typical threshold value for the decoy-state BB84
protocol [17, 18]. Considering that other noise sources,
such as encoding apparatus imperfections, detector dark
counts and afterpulsing, may contribute around 5% to
the QBER, the Raman noise needs to be 10 dB weaker
than the quantum signal as a practical guideline. We
3refer to this level as the Raman tolerance, as plotted in
Fig. 3.
In addition to temporal-filtering, we employ conven-
tional techniques for the suppression of Raman noise. As
the first step, we place a narrow bandpass filter (NBF) in
front of the quantum receiver, as shown in Fig. 1(a). The
filter has a passband of 0.56 nm, see Fig. 2(a). Including
its intrinsic loss of 0.6 dB, the filter reduces the Raman
noise by 15 dB. The overall improvement in the SNR is
14.4 dB. Despite the improvement, the Raman noise re-
mains considerably stronger than the tolerance for most
fiber lengths, as shown in Fig. 3(b). QKD is possible only
over very short lengths (approximately 3 km).
The next step is to lower the launch power of the data-
lasers using optical attenuators (Fig. 1(a)) to match the
sensitivity of the data photo-receivers. As an example,
Fig. 2(c) shows the bit error ratio as a function of re-
ceiving power for the 1611 nm data channel. Its sensitiv-
ity, defined as the minimum receiving power required to
achieve a bit error ratio no higher than 10−9, is mea-
sured to be -36.8 dBm at a data modulation rate of
1.25 Gb/s over a fiber link of 80 km. Taking the fiber loss
(0.2 dB/km) into account, a launch power much lower
than 0 dBm can be used to achieve error-free data com-
munications. For example, a launch power of -18.5 dBm
is more than sufficient for 80 km data transmission. With
lower launch powers, the Raman noise (Fig. 3(c)) is re-
duced considerably.
Applying temporal filtering, a new and crucial tech-
nique, to the conventional toolbox discussed above for
noise reduction, we can now reduce the Raman noise
further to below the Raman-tolerance threshold for dis-
tances up to 100 km. Here, we operate InGaAs APDs
using an alternating bias with a repetition frequency of
1 GHz. With a passive circuit for detection of extremely
weak avalanches, the detector has been demonstrated to
have an ultrashort dead time of less than 2 ns and sup-
port high count rates [21, 23, 24]. The photon detec-
tion efficiency is independent of the incident photon flux,
which is an underlying assumption required in the decoy-
state QKD protocol. Figure 2(d) shows the detection ef-
ficiency as a function of the detector gate delay under
pulsed laser excitation. When the detector and laser are
synchronized, the detector exhibits a peak detection effi-
ciency of 20%. In contrast, after delaying the detection
gate relative to the laser by 100 ps, the detection effi-
ciency drops sharply to virtually zero. The full width at
the half maximum for each efficiency peak is measured
as 100 ps, which is much shorter than the nominal de-
tection window of 500 ps. This is due to the low-noise
evolution of avalanches [25]: Only avalanches triggered at
the front edge of each gate can grow sufficiently strong
to be detected.
The short active time of 100 ps reduces the impact
of the Raman noise on QKD remarkably. The detector
is effectively a temporal filter, rejecting those photons
arriving outside of the active times. The random arrival
time of Raman photons is simulated by breaking the syn-
chronization between the pulsed laser and detector. As
shown in Fig. 2(d), the detection efficiency for these ran-
domly arriving photons is now reduced to approximately
2%, which is almost 10 times lower than the peak effi-
ciency for synchronized photons. The efficiency contrast
results in a temporal rejection of 9.4 dB for the Raman
photons. Now, the calculation shows the Raman noise is
tolerable for fiber distances up to 100 km [Fig. 3(d)].
We performed QKD experiments using a single fiber
shared simultaneously with optical clock synchronization
(see Appendix B) and bidirectional error-free 1.25 Gb/s
data communication. In the continuously operating
quantum subsystem, the decoy-state BB84 protocol is
implemented with three different pulse intensities. We
determine the secure key rate from Koashi’s security
proof [26], following the approach of Rice and Harring-
ton [27] to estimate single-photon parameters from decoy
states. Figure 4(a) plots the sifted and secure bit rates
as a function of fiber length. The sifted key rate falls
off exponentially with fiber length at a rate of approx-
imately 0.20 dB/km, which is the characteristic loss of
the fiber. The secure key rate decreases at the same rate
for short fiber distances (less than 50 km). We determine
the secure key rate as 935 and 507 kbit/s over 35 km and
50 km fibers, respectively. Increasing the fiber length
further, the secure bit rate decreases at a rate noticeably
faster than the fiber loss, due to the increased cost of pri-
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FIG. 2. Raman noise and its rejection. (a) Spectrum of back-
scattered Raman noise measured over 80 km with a 0 dBm
launch laser at a wavelength of 1611 nm; also shown are spec-
tra after a CWDM filter only, and a combination of a CWDM
coupler and a narrow band pass (NBF) filter. (b) Measured
(symbols) and calculated (solid lines) Raman noise power into
the quantum receiver through Bob’s CWDM coupler; (c) Bit
error rate measured over a fiber link of 80 km for the 1611 nm
receiver as a function of receiving power; (d) Single-photon
detection efficiencies as a function of gate delay of the gated
detector under synchronized (circles) and non-synchronized
(squares) illuminations. The illumination source is a pulsed
laser clocked at 1 GHz with an average flux of 0.02 photons
per pulse.
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FIG. 3. Raman noise into the quantum receiver. (a) Mea-
sured (symbol) and calculated (solid line) Raman noise after
Bob’s CWDM; (b) Raman noise after the narrow band pass
filter (NBF); In both (a) and (b), two 0 dBm data-lasers of
1591 and 1611 nm are launched simultaneously at Alice and
Bob, respectively. (c) Reduced Raman noise after lowering
the laser launch powers; (d) Effective Raman noise received
within the active time of the gated detectors. Solid lines (b–c)
are calculated results.
vacy amplification for higher QBERs. At 80 and 90 km,
the secure rates are determined to be 72 and 7.6 kbit/s,
respectively.
Figure 4(b) shows the measured QBER (symbol) as a
function of fiber length. Detector afterpulsing and appa-
ratus imperfection make up a floor of 3% for short fiber
lengths (less than 50 km). At these distances, both de-
tector dark counts and Raman noise are negligible. For
fiber lengths greater than 50 km, the QBER increases
gradually, because the dark counts and Raman contribu-
tion are no longer negligible as compared with the signal
counts. To illustrate the contribution from the Raman
noise, we plot the simulation of the QBER without data-
lasers (dashed line) in Fig. 4(b). At 90 km, the dark
counts contribute 2.5% and the Raman noise contributes
2.4% towards the total QBER of 7.9%. At 100 km, the
measured QBER exceeds 10%, and hence no secure keys
can be formed.
Using experimentally measured parameters only, we
simulate the secure key rates and QBER, as shown by
the solid lines in Figs. 4(a) and (b). The simulation pro-
cess is described in detail in Appendix C. We integrate
both the forward and backward Raman scatters, and ap-
ply 9.4 dB temporal-filtering into the simulation. We
also take into account extra loss due to fiber connectors
and fiber dispersion. At 90 km, the connectors make up
an additional 0.6 dB loss while the fiber dispersion adds
1 dB penalty to the data channels. The simulation is in
excellent agreement with the experimental results.
In comparison with previous demonstrations (Table I),
the present work has achieved not only a much longer
fiber span but also orders of magnitude higher secure
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contribution from data-lasers (dashed line).
key rates. We believe this advance will have significant
impact for future deployment of QKD technology and
networks. Firstly, the demonstrated distance of 90 km
exceeds the optimal span for a topologically-optimized
quantum network [28], and is longer than all the links
demonstrated in quantum networks to date [3–5]. Sec-
ondly, the reach distance is sufficiently to serve most links
in metropolitan networks [29]. In particular, it is suffi-
cient to support smart cities, where a typical link spans
from 30 – 80 km [30]. Thirdly, the QKD system is capable
of supporting 10 Gb Ethernet traffic, which is important
for low cost implementation, reliability and straightfor-
ward installation and maintenance. With 10Gb/s data
channels, the reach distance will be reduced to 65 km,
due to the lower receiver sensitivity at this data rate
[31]. Nevertheless, this reach distance exceeds 40 km,
the maximum fiber length defined in one 10 Gb Ethernet
standard [32]. With ability to support 10Gb/s Ethernet,
QKD will be able to seamlessly integrate into important
information infrastructures, such as business continuance
and disaster recovery, distributed storage networks, and
remote back-up, to offer the strongest cryptographic pro-
tection.
To conclude, we have shown the coexistence of QKD
and Gb/s data communications over a single fiber up
to 90 km. In achieving this, the Raman noise has
5been strongly suppressed by wavelength and temporal-
filtering. Following this breakthrough on communication
range and bit rate, we expect QKD will be an attractive
resource for securing data communication networks.
APPENDIX
A. Quantum subsystem.
Figures 1(b) and (c) show the optical layout of the
quantum transmitter and receiver. The transmitter con-
sists of a 1550 nm pulsed laser, an intensity modulator,
an asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer and an op-
tical attenuator. The receiver consists of a polarization
controller, an asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer
that matches the one in the transmitter, and two self-
differencing (SD) single-photon detectors.
The quantum system implements the standard BB84
protocol with decoy states [17, 18]. Different intensities
required for the decoy protocol are realised by intensity
modulation, while the average intensity leaving Alice is
set by the attenuator (Fig. 1(b)). In the decoy protocol,
the photon fluxes are set as 0.5, 0.1 and 0.0007 photons
per pulse with duty cycle of 98.8%, 0.8% and 0.4% for
signal and decoy states, respectively. The signal states
are used for the generation of the secure keys whereas the
weaker decoy pulses are used to protect the system from
potential photon number splitting attacks. Information
is encoded/decoded in the phase using the phase modu-
lators. The receiver is synchronized with the transmitter
using the clock subsystem (Fig. 1(a)). A feedback system
is used to compensate both the drift in optical polariza-
tion and phase; this is accomplished through the use of
a polarization controller and fiber stretcher respectively
[8]. The compensation operates continuously along with
the key distribution, and there is no sacrifice in the duty
cycle or the key rate.
We determine the secure key rate from Koashi’s secu-
rity proof [26], following the approach of Rice and Har-
rington [27] to estimate single-photon parameters from
decoy states. The secure key rate is given by
R = [Q1(1−H(e1))−QfEC(e)H(e) +Q0]/t, (1)
where Q1 is the estimated number of sifted bits from
single-photon states, e1 the estimated error rate of those
states, Q the total number of sifted bits, fEC the effi-
ciency of the error correction, e the QBER of sifted bits,
Q0 the estimated number of sifted arising from 0-photon
pulses (dark and Raman noise counts), and t the ses-
sion duration. Each QKD session is sufficiently long for
achieving a data block size greater than 5 × 108 bits.
H(x) = − log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the binary en-
tropy function. The single- and zero-photon quantities
are estimated using a linear programming approach as
given in Ref. [27], with the difference that we neglect fi-
nite key effects and hence all upper and lower bounds are
replaced with equalities.
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B. Clock subsystem.
Accurate synchronization is important for QKD; espe-
cially high speed QKD with gated detectors. For syn-
chronization in our QKD system, we use an off-the-shelf
diode laser at Alice pulsed at 10 MHz, rather than the
system clock rate of 1 GHz. The low pulsing rate allows
a much lower clock laser launch power to be used, thus
reducing the photon scatter into the quantum channel.
A standard small-form-pluggable receiver at Bob detects
the received clock before sending it to a frequency syn-
thesizer to regenerate the original 1 GHz system clock at
Bob.
Figure 5 shows the resulting timing jitter between Alice
and Bob as a function of Bob’s received clock power over
80 km of fiber. As the received power is increased, timing
jitter gradually decreases. However, there is a trade-off
in reduced timing jitter and QKD system performance.
Excessive clock laser intensity results in increased photon
scattering into the quantum channel raising the QBER.
On the other hand, insufficient clock laser intensity re-
duces the effective detection efficiency of the quantum
signal due to increased jitter between arriving laser pulses
and the detector. We decide to operate the clock subsys-
tem at -47.6 dBm. This optical power is approximately
30 times smaller than either data-laser. The clock laser
has thus negligible impact on the quantum channel.
The timing jitter between Alice and Bob is measured
to be approximately 10 ps, a value sufficiently small to
drive self-differencing detectors for efficient single-photon
detection. Note that these 10 ps include also the con-
tribution from drift in the fiber, and thus represent the
worst case for the recovered clock. Measurement at Bob’s
side produces a cycle-cycle jitter of 1 ps throughout the
power range used. This is indeed very low and ideal for
driving detectors with the self-differencing technique.
6C. Raman-scattered light intensity
Given a data-laser with optical power I at a wavelength
λd, its Raman-scattered light entering into the quantum
receiver can be obtained by integrating over the entire
fiber length (L) [33, 34], resulting in
IfRaman = β(λd, λq, δ)Ie
−αqL
∫ L
0
e(αq−αd)ℓdℓ, (2)
and
IbRaman = β(λd, λq, δ)I(1 − e
−(αd+αq)L), (3)
for the forward and backward reconfiguration, respec-
tively. Here, λq and δ are the central wavelength
and bandwidth of the quantum channel, respectively,
β(λd, λq,∆) the Raman scatter coefficient, and αd (αq)
the fiber attenuation coefficient at a wavelength of
λd(λq).
The Raman scatter coefficient β is measurable by the
back-scattered Raman spectrum, see Fig. 2(a) as an ex-
ample. We calculate the fiber length dependence of the
Raman power, as shown by the solid lines in Fig. 2(b).
The calculations agree well with the actual measure-
ments.
D. Simulation of the secure key rate
In order to simulate the secure key rate using Eqn. 1,
we need to calculate the otherwise directly measurable
quantities related to different classes of pulses used in
the decoy protocol. These parameters include the QBER
and transmittances. Transmittance is Bob’s detection
probability of a given class of pulses transmitted by Alice.
The QBER for the signal pulses (e) is approximated
using
e
.
= (eopt +
1
2
Pa) + en, (4)
where eopt is due to encoding apparatus imperfections,
such as finite interferometer visibility, misalignment and
imperfect modulation, Pa is the detector afterpulse prob-
ability, and en is the noise contribution from both dark
counts and Raman photons. Both eopt and Pa are fiber
length independent, and give a combined contribution of
2.8% to the QBER.
The fiber length dependent component of the QBER
is written as
en =
1
2
·
Pd + PR(L)
µe−αqLηBob + Pd + PR(L)
, (5)
where Pd is the detector dark count probability, PR(L)
the probability of registering a Raman photon per clock
cycle, µ the photon flux of signal states, and ηBob Bob’s
detection efficiency. At each fiber length, PR(L) is cal-
culated using Eqns. 2 and 3 with corrections from the
data-laser power control, spectral and temporal filtering,
and Bob’s detection efficiency.
Excluding detector afterpulsing, Bob’s overall detec-
tion probability can be written as
T =
3∑
i=1
Piµie
−αqLηBob + [Pd + PR(L)], (6)
where Pi (
∑
i Pi = 1) is the probability that Alice trans-
mits pulses with intensity of µi. By including detector
afterpulsing, we obtain the transmittance for each class
of pulses:
Ti = µie
−αqLηBob + [Pd + PR(L)] + T · Pa. (7)
We use fEC=1.1 in the simulation.
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